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Abstract 
We examine the effect on asset mispricing of different accounting methods in an experimental 
asset market characterized by bubbles and crashes.  In particular, we study three alternative 
asset value reporting treatments: (1) Fair Value (also known as Mark-to-Market – M2M), (2) 
Historical Cost (HC) and (3) Marked to Fundamental Value (M2F).    In addition, each of these 
treatments is replicated in two different financial leverage conditions.  In the first condition (No 
Loan) traders must purchase assets from their available cash balances without the option of 
borrowing.  In the second condition, (Loan), traders are given the option of taking out loans 
based on their balance sheet to finance asset purchases. In the No Loan condition, we find that 
reporting accounting values alone to subjects in a balance sheet format does not have a 
significant effect on mispricing for any of our alternative accounting method treatments.  In the 
Loan conditions, however, the M2F and M2M accounting methods exacerbate asset mispricing, 
yet the two differ in leverage dynamics. M2F markets are completely immune to defaults, while 
M2M markets experience the most frequent as well as most severe defaults.  
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1. Introduction 
The use of fair value accounting by banks and other financial institutions has been posited to be 
a factor that contributed to the financial crisis in 2008.1  Fair value accounting, which is 
sometimes referred to as “mark-to-market,” is the practice of increasing or decreasing the 
reported value of assets in a firm’s balance sheet to reflect changes in the market prices of 
those assets.  As a result, the balance sheet reports the current value of those assets rather 
than the outdated (historical) cost at which those assets were acquired.  Since 1992, financial 
institutions have been required to use fair value accounting to report some of the financial 
assets presented in bank balance sheets.  Advocates of fair value accounting argue that these 
reported values provide a more accurate measure of the financial health and viability of 
financial institutions and a better measure of capital adequacy, particularly for regulatory 
purposes (Morris and Sellon, 1991; Barth, 1994; Carey, 1995; Barth, Landsman and Wahlen, 
1995).  In addition, reported asset values based on fair value are assumed to be more relevant 
for most economic decisions than historical cost valuations.  This value relevance is supported 
by empirical data (Barth, 1994; Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan, 1996; Cornett, Rezaee, and 
Tehranian, 1996).  This virtue, however, depends on the reliability of the fair value measures.  
Reliability refers to the extent to which the fair value of an asset reflects its underlying 
fundamental economic value. 
Critics have argued that fair value accounting increases the volatility of reported earnings and capital of 
financial institutions, causing unintended consequences for the management of capital reserves.  
Market volatility can force firms to engage in short-term modifications of their investment positions in 
order to meet capital requirements imposed by bank regulators.  The bursting of the real estate bubble 
in 2007 and the subsequent financial crisis in 2008 is a prime example. During the preceding decade, 
steadily increasing home prices led to increased aggregate investment in real estate. When the bubble 
burst, the precipitous drop in real estate prices led to increased foreclosures and a corresponding 
decline in the value of bank assets. The decline in asset values immediately hit balance sheets because 
of fair value accounting.  Some banks were forced to sell assets at “fire-sale” prices in order to maintain 
                                                          
1 “… market-to-market accounting was in place during the Great Depression. Milton Friedman blames it for causing 
a majority of bank failures in the 1930s. It was suspended in 1938… The U.S. economy did just fine between 1938 
and 2007. During those 69 years, there were no panics or depressions. But when the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) – the rule-setting body for U.S. accounting standards – put a stringent fair value 
accounting rule (Rule 157) back into place in November 2007, all hell broke loose. This is not a coincidence. Fair 
value accounting is a disaster. “ Brian S. Wesbury, “It’s not as bad as you think”, 2009, John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey 
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liquidity and regulatory capital. The sell-off of assets further depressed market prices which, in turn, 
depressed the asset values of other banks, creating a contagion effect. 
Perhaps it is not surprising that most of the complaints about fair value accounting are voiced during 
periods of market distress. However, in order to avoid repeating past mistakes, it is important that we 
understand what factors caused the bubble in the first place. That is, did fair value accounting 
contribute to distortions in asset values that were later unwound during the financial crisis?  In this 
study, we examine the effect of three different accounting regimes on asset market prices in an 
experimental market setting that has been shown to be prone to a pattern of bubble and crash.  
Specifically, we examine how balance sheets that report asset values using either historical cost (HC), 
fair value (M2M) or fundamental value (M2F)2 affect the size and duration of asset market bubbles. 
We test these three accounting alternatives in laboratory asset market modeled by Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams (1988). The market has been used widely in the literature and is prone to price bubbles 
followed by crashes. Various explanations have been proposed for why price bubbles arise in a market 
with common knowledge in the underlying asset value3.  The purpose of our study is to examine 
different accounting methods in a market environment that provides stress tests on the robustness of 
these accounting methods of asset valuation. 
In theory, the accounting method used to report an asset’s value should not have any impact on the 
amount a buyer would be willing to pay to acquire that asset.  Nor should the reported value affect a 
seller’s reservation price for the same asset.  Hence, we do not expect that asset value reporting, alone, 
will have much effect on the market prices of assets.  However, when the reported value of an asset is 
used to determine potential debt capacity for a borrower, the accounting valuation may have an effect 
on the amount borrowed and subsequently invested. If market prices are inflated, as is the case in a 
bubble, reported asset values would also be overstated under fair value accounting.  This could 
potentially result in higher debt balances and greater market liquidity.  When the bubble bursts and 
                                                          
2 This method is akin to a “mark-to-model,” where the asset value is set equal to the value determined by an 
accepted valuation model using parameter values obtained from public sources.  An example is the use of a 
discounted cash flow model with a quoted discount rate to value a bond.  At best, this method uses market inputs 
as parameter values, so the same caveats regarding reliability apply as with mark-to-market values.  For our 
purposes, the fundamental value is defined as the undiscounted expected dividend paid on an asset.  As such, it is 
unambiguously determined independent of market prices. However, unlike the other two accounting methods of 
which the numbers can be obtained from either current prices or past prices, fundamental values are usually costly 
to obtain.  
3 These factors include liquidity, experience, transparency, novelty of environment and speculation (Caginalp, 
Porter, and Smith, 2001; Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore, 2005, Hussam, Porter, and Smith, 2008; Lei, Noussair, 
and Plott, 2001) Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001) find that bubbles do not disappear in markets in which speculation 
is not possible. Kirchler, Huber, and Stöckl (2012) argue that bubbles are related to the declining fundamental 
value because traders do not fully comprehend the process. Noussair and Ruffieux (2001) find bubbles in markets 
with constant fundamental values. For a survey of bubbles in experimental assets see Palan (2014). 
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asset market prices fall, accounting values are adjusted downward and outstanding debt may no longer 
be adequately backed by the assets, creating a potential for default.  To address the effect of reported 
asset values on debt capacity and market liquidity, we evaluate two financial leverage conditions for 
each of the accounting alternatives examined.  In one of these conditions, subjects were required to 
purchase assets from available cash balances without the option of borrowing.  In the other condition, 
subjects are allowed to borrow funds secured by the accounting value of the assets they own.  The 
potential effect of this additional debt capacity is to increase liquidity in the market.  The amount of 
debt available depends on the reported value of the assets and, consequently, distortions in asset values 
based on the accounting method used can have an impact on market liquidity. 
Our results suggest that the alternative reporting methods have little direct impact on the magnitude or 
the duration of asset market bubbles.  However, when reported asset values are used to determine debt 
capacity, we find that traders borrow more in a fair value reporting environment and this increased 
liquidity leads to larger price bubbles of greater duration.  Furthermore, loan defaults were more likely 
in markets where assets were reported using fair value accounting than in markets using historical cost 
or fundamental value. 
We find that the defaults are related to the traders’ leverage levels and leverage dynamics can explain 
why the three accounting alternatives perform differently. In M2F, loans are closely anchored on the 
fundamental value regardless of the market prices; as fundamental values decline over time, traders are 
de-leveraged automatically. Throughout all M2F markets, no default is observed though the overall 
amount of debt is initially comparable to that of M2M. In M2M, financial leverage increases over time as 
prices appreciate and move in the opposite direction of asset fundamentals. Those traders with high 
leverage positions are the most likely to be unable to raise sufficient capital to pay back loans at 
maturity. In these experimental asset markets, prices tend to begin below fundamental value and then 
race above fundamental value until they run out of steam and crash.  With this type of price pattern, the 
HC treatment provides for a lower debt capacity that eases the unwinding of individual loan positions. 
We also find that those subjects who default have the largest discrepancy between their true debt levels 
(defined as the ratio of debt to total assets at fundamental value) and reported debt levels (the ratio of 
debt to reported asset values). M2M has a larger discrepancy than HC, that is, M2M understates 
reported debt levels the most. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental market design 
and loan mechanism. Section 3 reports on the bubble characteristics, loan adoptions and defaults, 
followed by an examination of the leveraging process across treatments. The last section concludes. 
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2. Experimental Design 
We employ a 3×2 experimental design using three different asset reporting treatments and two 
financial leverage conditions. The alternative accounting treatments include (1) Fair Value (also 
known as Mark-to-Market -- M2M)), (2) Historical Cost (HC) and (3) Mark-to-Fundamental 
Value (M2F).  Each of these accounting treatments represents an alternative asset valuation 
framework.  In addition, each of these treatments is replicated in two different financial 
leverage conditions.  In the first condition (No Loans – NL) traders must purchase assets from 
their available cash balances without the option of borrowing.  In the second condition, (Loans 
– L), traders are given the option of taking out loans to finance asset purchases. This design 
structure is summarized in Table 1.   
 
2.1 Asset Market 
Our market structure follows the type of asset market initiated by Smith, Suchanek and 
Williams (1988). This design has been used in hundreds of studies and bubbles/crashes are 
frequent in these markets. Hence, the design is suitable for introducing volatility into the 
market and offers stress tests for alternative asset value measurement methods. 
Our economic environment consisted of a risky asset (a Share) that paid a series of dividends 
with common knowledge on the distribution.  The asset was traded in a double auction market 
during a trading period. All prices, dividends, and earnings were denominated in US cents (¢), 
and paid out at a ratio of 1:1 at the end of the experiment.   
Each market is divided into 15 periods.  Each share pays a random dividend at the end of each 
period.  The dividend is set at either 0¢, 8¢, 28¢ or 60¢ per period per share. Each of these four 
amounts is equally likely to occur and dividend draws in different periods are independent from 
each other.  Hence, each share is expected to earn the owner an average dividend of 24¢ per 
period.  Over a lifetime of 15 periods, a share is expected to generate a total dividend payout of 
360¢. Dividend earnings are realized at the end of each period and are added to the holder’s 
cash account immediately.  Each trader’s cash and share holdings carry over to the next period.  
As periods continue, the expected value of the remaining share dividends is estimated to 
decline by 24¢ each period. In period 15, there would be one last dividend payment.  After that, 
all shares expire worthless. Thus, a participant’s earnings are equal to whatever amount of cash 
she has at the end of period 15. Trading in each period lasts for 3 ½ minutes. The market setting 
is common knowledge to all participants.  A screenshot of the market information is provided in 
Figure 1. 
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Nine subjects were recruited for each market. They each were endowed with a starting 
portfolio of cash and shares. 3 types of endowments were used: (1080¢, 3 shares), (720¢, 
4shares) and (360¢, 5 shares). 3 subjects were allocated with each type of portfolio. The 
endowments were exactly the same as the “Share Rich” treatment of Caginalp, Porter, and Smith 
(2001). The endowments were the same for all sessions.  Thus, all subjects started with the 
same expected portfolio wealth of $21.60.  
 
Figure 1: Market Screen Shot 
 
 
2.2 Accounting Method Treatments 
As stated previously, three treatments of accounting methods are tested: (M2F), (HC) and 
(M2M). At the end of a trading period, a financial report is provided to each subject. The report 
tells each subject their period dividend earnings and also the value of one’s share holdings 
determined under the specific accounting rule used in that session.  
In the M2F treatment each share is valued at its fundamental value, which is the remaining 
expected dividend value.   For example, at the end of the first period, each share is valued at 
24¢×14= 336¢; at the end of the second period, at 24¢×13= 312¢, etc.  In practice, this value is 
not commonly known as it is in our experiment, but it used herein as an idealized benchmark 
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which we can use to contrast with against the other, generally accepted accounting valuation 
methods. 
For the HC treatment each share is valued at its acquisition cost.  If a share was purchased at 
300¢, it is valued at 300¢. For the originally endowed shares, they were considered as being 
purchased at 360¢. Since shares are likely to be purchased at different prices we use a first-in-
first-out (FIFO) rule to value the inventory after a sale. For example, if a participant made 3 
purchases sequentially at 300¢, 350¢ and 400¢, when she sells one share, the total share value 
based on HC becomes (350¢+400¢=) 750¢. 
 
Finally, for M2M, each share is valued at the closing price of a period.  If no trade occurred in a 
period, the last trade price in the preceding period was used.  This event never occurred in our 
experiments. 
To reinforce the reported account values, we asked each subject to write down their share 
holding values on a piece of paper at the end of each period.  The end-of-period accounting 
report screen can be found in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: End-of-Period Financial Report 
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2.3 Loan Adoption 
We evaluate the performance of accounting methods under both a No Loan (NL) and Loan (L) 
condition. Thus, we have a 3 accounting methods × 2 loan conditions design (See Table I). The 
three NL treatment end-of-period reports only list “Cash Balance”, “Values of Shares Held” and 
“Net Worth (Cash +Shares)”, without mentioning any loan related items. The three Loan 
treatments allow subjects to accept loans based upon the value of their shares held.  
Once asset values were determined by the accounting methods, subjects in Loan treatments 
were allowed to borrow up to 50% of their reported asset holding values.  Specifically, at the 
end of each period, the loan algorithm evaluated whether to offer more loans to the subject or 
reduce the outstanding loan amount based on a trader’s share value determined by the specific 
accounting method.  At the end of a period, a subject’s debt capacity was set at 50% of her 
current share values.  When “Loans Outstanding” was below 50% of share value, the subject 
was offered the option to take on more debt. In the case when Loans Outstanding exceeded 
50% of share value, the excess amount was automatically reduced from the subject’s cash 
balance (a margin call). The new loan availability (available debt capacity) was automatically 
reflected in “Change in Loan Amount” in the financial report at the end of each round (See 
Figure 2). 
Loans first became available to subjects at the end of period 1.  All loans matured in period 13 
and were required to be repaid in full at the end of that period.  At the end of period 1 through 
period 12, subjects were given the option to adjust their loan amounts.  All loans were provided 
at zero interest rate for simplicity.  
A loan default was triggered when the Loans Outstanding amount had to be reduced but the 
trader’s cash position was insufficient to cover the loan repayment.  In this case, the trader’s 
account was frozen and she could not trade until she had accumulated enough cash to cover 
the outstanding loan amount.  In the next period, her shares were liquidated by computer 
algorithm until the excess loan amount was covered. The algorithm was set to automatically 
sell one of the liquidated shares to the highest available bid in the market every 10 seconds.  
Once the sale had generated enough revenue to cover the required loan repayment, the 
account was immediately released back to the trader. In the situation when even complete 
liquidation did not generate enough revenue to repay the outstanding loan, the account was 
closed.  The subject was considered bankrupt and had zero earnings; any remaining loss was 
absorbed by the experimenter. 
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Table I: Design Structure 
 
 
Accounting Methods 
Loan Condition 
Fundamental Value 
(M2F) 
Historic Cost 
(HC) 
Mark-to-Market 
(M2M) 
No Loan (NL) 3 sessions 3 sessions 3 sessions 
Loan (L)  6 sessions 6 sessions 6 sessions 
 
 
2.4 Subjects, Training, and Incentives 
 
All participants went through intensive training for the experiment.  Participants engaged in a 
20-minute instruction session, which includes a slideshow with a pre-recorded reading of the 
instructions in a PowerPoint presentation.  After the instructions were read, subjects answered 
a series of quiz questions about the fundamental value structure, earnings calculation, loan 
eligibility and requirements, and trading operations. The instructions and quiz questions are 
provided in Appendix.   
When the instructions were concluded, subjects participated in a 2-period practice session to 
become familiar with the trading and accounting interfaces.  Subjects were told that the 
practice was not related to their earnings and they should feel free to try out the program.  At 
the end of the first practice period, the financial report was explained to them item by item.  In 
the second period, trading continued and at the end of the period the financial report 
information was reviewed again.   
Each participant was paid one dollar for every 100 cents earned through endowments or 
trading. On average, subjects made $21.86, plus a show-up fee of $7.  
 
 3. Results 
Let tP be the mean price of period t; tFV  the fundamental value of period t; FV  the mean 
fundamental value in the market; tMedianP  the median price in period t; N  the total number 
of periods.  Following Stöckl, Huber and Kirchler (2010), we analyze the following eight metrics 
of asset prices: 
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These eight measures all provide information on price deviations. For Magnitude, Price 
Amplitude, Average Bias Duration and Relative Deviation, higher values are associated with 
larger bubbles. Total Dispersion, Haessels R2 and Relative Absolute Deviation measure how well 
prices track the fundamental value and provide another perspective on mispricing.  
 
3.1 Accounting Treatments with no Loans 
Figure 3 plots the average price per period for the no loan cases.  We also report in Table II the 
bubble characteristics for these cases.  We find the typical pattern as with markets when an 
accounting balance sheet is not provided.  In all three treatments, the markets start with under-
valuations followed by overvaluations and end with a crash toward the fundamental value.  
However, the average price in the M2M treatment is higher across periods than either the HC 
or M2F treatments.  M2M by itself seems to make the market more ebullient, however, no 
statistically significant difference between treatments is found4.  We next examine how this 
                                                          
4 Permutation tests with 1500 reps on all pairings do not produce any p-value less than 0.10. Given the size of our 
sample, the power of our tests is limited. 
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accounting interacts on the financial side of the ledger when this accounting information is 
used to obtain loans. 
Table II. Bubble Measures for the Accounting Treatments without Loans 
Bubble Measures for No Loan Sessions 
 Magnitude 
Price 
Amplitude 
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R2 Duration 
Relative 
Average 
Deviation 
Relative 
Deviation 
M2F -4.98 0.79 1070.00 -2.78 0.30 7.00 0.37 -0.03 
         
HC -7.91 0.67 962.17 -6.32 0.35 9.00 0.34 -0.04 
         
M2M 56.76 0.78 1266.33 53.84 0.46 10.33 0.44 0.30 
 
 
Figure 3 Mean Prices for No Loan treatments 
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3.2 Accounting Treatments with Loans 
Figure 4 plots the average transaction prices across periods for the loan cases. As can be seen, 
M2M markets have higher mean prices than HC markets in all 15 periods. M2F has higher 
average prices than HC in all periods but the last two periods. Comparing M2M with M2F, the 
prices in the M2M markets start lower than the corresponding prices in M2F markets, then are 
higher in periods 10 through 15. Overall, the loan markets produce higher prices than the no 
loan markets.5  This is not surprising since there is increased liquidity in periods 2-13 as traders 
take on more debt. 
Figure 4: Mean Prices for Loan Treatments 
 
Table III Panel A reports the means of each bubble measure across treatments for the loan 
cases; Panel B provides p-values from student t tests (1-sided, assuming equal variances) on 
treatment difference.   One striking result is that even if we report asset prices in the 
                                                          
5 The magnitude, price amplitude and duration of the bubbles were higher for the loan (L) markets than for the no 
loans (NL) markets for each of the three accounting method treatments.  These differences are statistically 
significant based on a one-sided permutation test on the pooled data (magnitude: p=0.08, price amplitude: p<0.01, 
duration: p=0.04). 
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accounting reports at the known fundamental value (M2F) we still get bubbles that are similar 
to those that are generated using either of the standard accounting methods to value assets.  
However, between the two standard methods of asset valuation (M2M and HC), there is a 
difference in the character of the bubbles.  In particular, the size of the bubble and extent of 
asset mispricing are significantly larger under M2M.  One reason for this difference is the effect 
on market leverage that is created from these two methods.  We examine this feature of our 
experimental design next. 
Table III.  Bubble Measures for the Accounting Treatments with Loans 
Panel A: Bubble Measures for Loan Sessions 
 Magnitude 
Price 
Amplitude 
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R2 Duration 
Relative 
Absolute 
Deviation 
Relative 
Deviation 
M2F 
72.40 0.97 1580.33 72.84 0.31 9.67 0.542 0.38 
(33.64) (0.33) (504.42) (33.76) (0.26) (2.42) (0.17) (0.18) 
         
HC 
8.77 0.90 1577.58 8.11 0.36 11.17 0.540 0.04 
(88.07) (0.30) (603.59) (88.24) (0.32) (2.32) (0.21) (0.46) 
         
M2M 
71.89 1.23 1894.17 68.68 0.08 11.83 0.67 0.37 
(62.03) (0.39) (588.86) (59.16) (0.10) (1.33) (0.21) (0.32) 
Standard deviations in parenthesis: 6 observations in each treatment. The numbers in bold represent the 
highest values across 3 treatments. 
 
Panel B: Student t test within Loan Sessions 
 Magnitude 
Price 
Amplitude 
Total 
Dispersion 
Average 
Bias 
Haessel 
R2 Duration 
Relative 
Absolute 
Deviation 
Relative 
Deviation 
M2F 
v.s. 
HC 
0.065* 0.353 0.497 0.062* 0.381 0.149 0.493 0.064* 
HC 
v.s. 
M2M 
0.091* 0.068* 0.190 0.096* 0.033** 0.277 0.161 0.091* 
M2M 
v..s 
M2F 
0.493 0.126 0.172 0.442 0.037** 0.042** 0.143 0.493 
Panel B lists the p-values from the 1-sided student t test assuming equal variances. * denotes 0.10 significance; 
** denotes 0.05 significance. 
 
3.3 Loan Activity 
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Table IV, Panel A lists the average amount of total debt in the three treatments.  Panel B 
formally tests the differences with a two-sample t test with equal variances and with a two-
sample Mann-Whitney test.  Again, there is no statistical difference in the debt levels in the 
M2M and HC treatments relative to using fundamental value accounting (M2F treatment).  
However, M2M markets have significantly higher debt levels than HC markets. 
The higher amounts of debt in M2M and M2F coincide with the higher magnitude and 
amplitude of the bubbles relative to HC.  The liquidity provided by loan availability appears to 
be fueling the bubble.  We formally test this observation using Fama-MacBeth Regression 
(Fama and MacBeth, 1973). We have 18 markets with 12 periods in each where subjects can 
take out loans.  The Fama-MacBeth regression corrects for the fact that each market is 
autocorrelated.  We begin by first regressing each period’s mean price against the 
corresponding total debt level for every market; second, we measure the average and the 
standard errors of the coefficients obtained from the first step across 18 markets. The standard 
errors correct for time-series correlation. Table V provides the regression results.   The debt 
variable has positive and significant on the mean price in each period.  This is consistent with 
the findings of Caginalp, Porter and Smith (2001) that liquidity fuels bubbles. Given the debt 
exposure in these markets, we now turn to default behavior in these markets. 
Table IV. Debt Levels 
Panel A 
Treatment Average Total Debt per Period 
M2F 2023.5 (543.7) 
HC 1574.0 (1146.1) 
M2M 2507.6 (1045.2) 
Standard deviations in parenthesis. 6 observations in 
each treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B 
Null Hypothesis t test p-value 
Mann-Whitney 
Test 
p-value 
Loan (M2F)≥Loan(M2M) 0.169 0.100 
Loan (HC)≥Loan(M2M) 0.086* 0.055* 
Loan (HC)≥Loan(M2F) 0.203 0.261 
* indicates 0.10 significance. 
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Table V: Fama-MacBeth Regression on the Effect of Debt on Market Price 
 
 
 
  
3.4 Defaults  
Recall that all loans are due in period 13.  A default occurs when a trader’s cash holdings fall 
short of the loan termination amounts.  When a default occurs, the defaulter’s shares are taken 
into custody and sold to the current highest market bid at 10 seconds intervals.  Once the 
raised capital from liquidation is sufficient to cover the payback short fall, the defaulter’s 
remaining shares are returned and the trading restriction is removed. 
No default was observed in any of the M2F markets, while a third of the HC markets and half of 
the M2M markets experienced default.  In each of those markets, the default event was limited 
to a single trader.  Figure 5 plots the trading prices (including the liquidating trades indicated 
with a red Δ), together with the Total Debt (the dashed line) in each trading period.  All the 
defaults involved a high level of debt except the default in Market 4 of the HC treatment where 
the default involved the liquidation of just one share.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Mean Price Coef. Std. Err. t-stat P>t 
     Debt 0.055 0.004 12.46 0.000 
constant 155.623 4.866 31.98 0.000 
n=216, R-squared=0.372 
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Figure 5 Markets with Defaults 
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Table VI provides the details of the five defaults.  What stands out is the size of the price crash 
following the default.  The average price fall in the two HC markets is 42.7 cents while in the 
three M2M markets the average crash in price is 194.8.   
Table VI. Default Details and Market Crash 
Session 
Name 
Shares 
Liquidated 
Defaulter’s 
Cash 
Shortage 
in Period 
13 
Average 
Liquidating 
Price in 
Period 14 
Average 
Trading 
Price in 
Period 
13 
Average 
Trading 
Price in 
Period 
14 
Price Crash 
from Period 
13 to 14 
HC –Mkt1 17 1428 6.8 55.7 5.9 -49.8 
HC –Mkt4 1 12 135.0 158.0 122.5 -35.5 
  
 
    M2M – Mkt3 12 3160 277.4 503.3 319.9 -183.4 
M2M – Mkt5 30 2820 100.2 303.3 83.3 -220.0 
M2M – Mkt6 5 1033 174.2 477.0 296.0 -181.0 
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3.5 Financial Leverage 
Financial leverage is typically measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. We employ two 
definitions of this ratio – a book debt ratio based on reported accounting numbers and a debt 
ratio based on fundamental value.  The book debt ratio is defined as follows: 
ValueAccountingShareCash
Loans
BookonAssetsTotal
sLiabilitieRatioDebtBook
       
   
+
==  
In Figure 6 we chart the average book debt ratio for each period and treatment. Each treatment 
results in a slight downward trend in this ratio. However, this downward trend is somewhat 
misleading.  As the experiment progresses, dividends are paid, so the overall cash balance 
increases as the fundamental value (expected remaining dividend) decreases.  Fundamental 
value accounting creates an automatic deleveraging effect as traders are forced to maintain a 
loan balance at less than or equal to 50% of the reported share value. Hence, the numerator in 
the ratio declines while the denominator in the ratio remains relatively constant.  The 
decreasing ratio reflects the declining amount of outstanding loans. 
In contrast, the reported value of the shares does not decrease in the HC markets and increases 
over time in the M2M markets, even as cash dividends are paid.  Under both accounting 
regimes, the denominator in the book debt ratio increases each period until the bubble bursts, 
causing the book debt ratio to trend downward even as loan balances are increasing.   
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Figure 6.  Book Debt Ratio over Time for Three Accounting Treatments 
 
 
A different perspective on leverage is provided by the debt ratio.  The debt ratio differs from 
the book debt ratio only in the denominator value of the shares held.  Instead of using shares’ 
book values reported under each accounting alternative, we use shares’ fundamental values. 
The book debt ratio can be interpreted as a nominal measure of financial leverage, while actual 
leverage is measured by the debt ratio. 
ValuelFundamentaShareCash
Loans
AssetsTotal
sLiabilitieRatioDebt
     
  
+
==  
Figure 7 plots the mean debt ratio among the individual traders in each period for each 
treatment.   For the M2F treatment, the debt ratio is the same as the book debt ratio, by 
definition.  As can be seen, the mean debt ratio for M2F traders tends to decline over time.  In 
contrast, the mean debt ratio for HC traders stays about the same over time, and the mean 
debt ratio for M2M increases over time and hits its highest value in period 13.  
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In period 13, the M2M traders have the highest average debt ratio while M2F subjects have the 
lowest.  M2F accounting tracks the fundamental value. The level of individual indebtedness 
explains why M2M is most prone to defaults and M2F is immune to defaults. 
Figure 7. Debt Ratio over Time for Three Accounting Treatments 
 
The book debt ratio gives the impression that financial leverage is decreasing over time.  This is 
true in the M2F markets, where the declining fundamental value forces traders to de-leverage 
as the experiment progresses.  However, in the HC markets, actual financial leverage remains 
relatively constant while in the M2M markets, actual leverage is increasing.  The inflated 
reported value of the shares in the HC and M2M markets gives the misleading impression that 
the trader has assets of sufficient value to cover the loan repayment when the loan is due, even 
as the loan balance is increasing.  In fact, when the trader tries to liquidate shares to repay the 
loan in period 13, the market price crashes to fundamental value and the true level of financial 
leverage is revealed. 
Table VII compares the average debt ratios and book debt ratios in Period 13 for all 18 markets 
as well as these two ratios for the individual traders who defaulted in each market.  
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Table VII: Debt Ratio(%), Book Debt Ratio (%) and Defaults at Maturity 
     
Defaulters 
Treatment MKT 
Debt 
Ratio 
Book Debt 
Ratio 
Anyone 
Default? 
Debt 
Ratio 
Book Debt 
Ratio 
M2F* 
1 5.4 5.4 No 
  2 4.8 4.8 No 
  3 1.8 1.8 No 
  4 1.9 1.9 No 
  5 3.8 3.8 No 
  6 7.2 7.2 No 
  
 mean  4.1 4.1       
HC 
1 15.0 6.2 Yes 110.7 32.5 
2 4.7 3.2 No 
  3 0.2 0.2 No 
  4 4.2 2.3 Yes 38.0 21.0 
5 8.4 4.0 No 
  6 5.5 3.9  No 
  
  mean 6.3 3.3       
M2M 
1 2.1 1.6 No 
  2 8.0 4.8 No 
  3 17.5 5.7 Yes 144.2 40.0 
4 8.5 6.2 No 
  5 17.4 6.3 Yes 129.9 31.7 
6 18.1 8.5 Yes 89.1 24.9 
  mean  11.9 5.6       
The ratios are reported for Period 13 when all loans mature. A debt ratio over 100% 
means that the subject’s net equity is negative.  
* By definition, the debt ratio is identical to the book debt ratio for M2F markets. These 
values are included for comparison purposes. 
 
Comparing the debt ratio to the book debt ratio in each market indicates the extent to which 
financial leverage is understated by the book debt ratio. In all of the M2M markets and all but 
one of the HC markets, the actual debt ratio is greater than the book debt ratio. In the HC 
markets, the mean debt ratio is 6.3% compared to an average book debt ratio of 3.3%.  In the 
M2M markets, the difference is more dramatic; the mean debt ratio of 11.9% is more than 
double the average book debt ratio of 5.6%.  Moreover, the markets experiencing defaults have 
higher debt ratios relative to other markets in the same treatments, while their book debt 
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ratios are much closer to the average.  Table VIII suggests that these defaulters’ balance sheets 
look healthy on paper, while, in fact, they are set up for a difficult deleveraging event. 
 
 3.6 Debt and Earnings 
Does taking on more debt have an effect on earnings? To answer this question, we regress each 
subject’s earnings against their average loan level across periods: 
 
εβα +×+= jj LOANAVGEARNINGS _  
 
jLOANAVG _  measures each subject’s average loan holdings from period 2 to period 13. 
Table VIII reports the OLS regression results in two samples: One includes all subjects; the 
second excludes those who default. 
 
Table VIII: OLS Regression on Earnings and Loan Level 
EARNINGS All Subjects Exclude those who default 
   
AVG_LOAN 
0.73 
(0.27) 
t=2.74*** 
1.43 
(0.28) 
t=5.18*** 
Constant 
2010.74 
(120.37) 
t=16.7*** 
1960.8 
(110.75) 
t=17.7*** 
 
n=162 
R2 =0.0447 
n=157 
R2=0.1475 
 
 
As can we seen from the table, earnings are positively and significantly related to loan adoption, 
indicating that financial leverage helps as long as you don’t default.  Specifically, borrowing 
early to buy the asset when prices are below fundamental value, riding the price momentum as 
the bubble grows, and then unwinding the position in a timely fashion, is a strategy that is 
indeed profitable.  Timing is everything. 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
5. Conclusions 
We conduct 27 laboratory markets in which subjects were allowed to trade shares of an asset 
that paid a cash dividend at the end of each of fifteen trading periods. At the end of each period 
subjects were presented with a balance sheet detailing their cash position and the value of 
their shares. The main focus of our study is the effect of alternative accounting methods for 
valuing assets and their effect on potential asset mispricing. 
Our experimental design uses a well-studied environment that reliably produces bubbles and 
crashes in asset prices.  We use this environment to stress test three accounting methods: 
Mark-to-Market (M2M), Historical Cost (HC), and Mark-to-Fundamental value (M2F).  These 
methods were used to report asset values in a balance sheet to show subjects their net worth 
position.  In addition, a treatment was created to link asset value on individual balance sheets 
to the ability of subjects to take out loans to increase their cash position.  In the treatment 
when loans are absent, the accounting effects are hardly distinguishable.  That is, there seems 
to be no link between the reporting of balance sheet asset values and the characteristics of the 
price bubbles.  However, in the loan treatments, the bubbles are exacerbated and the 
characteristics of the bubbles were related to the accounting method used to report asset 
values.    
We examine the leveraging process under each accounting alternative. Overall, M2M and M2F 
have higher loan presence than HC, and these two have similar loan levels. It is this enhanced 
liquidity that helps explains the size of bubbles. When asset prices are inflated on the balance 
sheet, the indebtedness of individual holdings is naturally understated.  Both M2M and HC 
accounting systematically understate the actual debt-to-asset ratios, with their balance sheets 
appearing healthy on paper. M2M markets experienced the worst market crashes and the most 
frequent loan defaults. HC markets suffer from the same debt understatement, however, the 
leverage is limited and thus the deleveraging damage is less severe.  
M2M and M2F also differ in leverage levels at different points of time. We find that in M2M 
markets the debt ratio steadily increases over time which makes M2M markets prone to default 
at loan maturity.  In contrast, debt ratios in the M2F markets gradually decrease as the falling 
fundamental value provides an automatic built-in deleveraging mechanism. This feature of M2F 
makes them completely immune to defaults.  
Our study demonstrates that the relevance of M2M or HC accounting depends on how well 
market prices reflect fundamentals (directly or indirectly). When reported asset values depart 
from fundamental value, markets are vulnerable to costly mistakes and corrections.  
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Appendix A: Instructions 
Instructions
This is an experiment in market decision making. You will be paid in 
cash for your participation at the end of the experiment. Different 
participants may earn different amounts. The amount that you earn 
will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of others.
The experiment will take place through the computer terminals at 
which you are seated. If you have any questions during the instruction 
round, raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer your 
question. 
If any difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise your hand, 
and someone will assist you.
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Appendix A: Quizzes 
 
Questions for both No Loan and Loan Treatments 
(1) How many dividend payments would a share pay out in the experiment? (Answer: 15.) 
(2) True or False?   Your net worth at the end of a round is your cash plus the value of 
shares you have on hand minus your loan. (Answer: True.) 
(3) What is the average dividend payout per round per share? (Answer: 24 cents.) 
(4) How much would a share be worth when the market is closed at the end of round 15? 
(Answer: Zero.) 
(5) The value of each share you held reported in the financial statement at the end of a 
round is determined by? (Answer: Average Remaining Dividends (in M2F) or Purchase 
Cost (in HC) or the last transaction price of the round (in M2M)) 
(6) Your earnings from the experiment will be __? (Answer: Your final cash on hand.) 
 
Additional Questions for Loan Treatments 
(1) Your loan can never exceed what __% of your net worth? (Answer: 50.) 
(2) Suppose at the end of a period your loan outstanding was 600.  Your net worth was 
2800.  How much can your loan be increased by? (Answer: 800.) 
(3) Suppose at the end of a period your loan was 600.  Your net worth was 1000, how much 
of the loan must be paid down? (Answer: 100.) 
(4) At the end of which round should loans be paid down completely? (Answer: 13.) 
(5) True or False? If you do have not have enough cash on hand to cover the required loan 
reduction, your shares will be taken into custody and auctioned off at whatever prices 
available in the market. (Answer: True.) 
 
